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Abstract—The growing demand for data has driven the Service
Providers (SPs) to provide differential treatment of traffic to
generate additional revenue streams from Content Providers
(CPs). While SPs currently only provide best-effort services to
their CPs, it is plausible to envision a model in near future,
where CPs are willing to sponsor quality of service for their
content in exchange of sharing a portion of their profit with SPs.
This quality sponsoring becomes invaluable especially when the
available resources are scarce such as in wireless networks, and
can be accommodated in a non-neutral network. In this paper,
we consider the problem of Quality-Sponsored Data (QSD) in a
non-neutral network. In our model, SPs allow CPs to sponsor a
portion of their resources, and price it appropriately to maximize
their payoff. The payoff of the SP depends on the monetary
revenue and the satisfaction of end-users both for the non-
sponsored and sponsored content, while CPs generate revenue
through advertisement. Note that in this setting, end-users still
pay for the data they use. We analyze the market dynamics
and equilibria in two different frameworks, i.e. sequential and
bargaining game frameworks, and provide strategies for (i) SPs:
to determine if and how to price resources, and (ii) CPs: to
determine if and what quality to sponsor. The frameworks
characterize different sets of equilibrium strategies and market
outcomes depending on the parameters of the market.
Keywords—net neutrality, game theory, sponsored data plans,
wireless networks
I. INTRODUCTION
The growing demand for data and the saturating revenue
of Broadband Service Providers (SPs) have driven the SPs to
provide differential treatment of traffic to generate additional
revenue streams from content providers (CPs). This occurs
both in wired and wireless networks. In addition to the SPs
generating revenue from the CPs, with such a model, CPs
can ensure the quality of service they provide for their end-
users particularly when resources are scarce such as in wireless
networks.
This differential treatment of traffic can be accommodated
in a non-neutral network1. This has raised serious concerns
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Part of this work was presented in Wiopt’15 [1].
1An instance of a differential treatment in wireless cellular networks is
AT&T that has launched a sponsored data plan [2] that allows CPs to pay
for the data bytes that their users consume, thereby not eating into the users’
data quota. Thus, the content of the CPs that pay the sponsoring fee is treated
differently than the content of the rest of the CPs.
among net neutrality advocates, especially with the recent
landmark ruling favoring Verizon in its case against the Federal
Communication Committee (FCC) in January 2014 [3]. In
February 2015, FCC reclassified the Internet as a utility [4],
providing the ground for this agency to secure even more strict
net-neutrality rules. However, this will not be the end of the
net-neutrality debates in U.S. Further actions, from the SPs
and proponents of relaxing net-neutrality rules, are expected.
In addition, the net-neutrality issue is not restricted to the
U.S. Many countries are debating on these rules, and have
different policies for SPs to handle the traffic. For example,
in October 2015, the European parliament has rejected legal
amendments for strict net-neutrality rules, and passed a set of
rules that allow for sponsored data plans and Internet fast lanes
for “specialized services”[5].
Given the incentives of SPs and some CPs to adopt a non-
neutral regime, while SPs only provide best-effort service to
their CPs in the current model, it is easy to envision a model in
the near future, in which CPs require quality of service for the
data they sponsor. For example, if YouTube wants to increase
the number of its active users through sponsoring its videos,
it would derive value (utility) from the sponsorship only if the
videos are delivered at a good quality. We refer to this model as
the Quality-Sponsored Data (QSD) model, wherein (spectral)
resources at the SP are sponsored to ensure quality for the
data bytes being delivered to the end users. This a significant
departure from the current model in which CPs sponsor only
the data bytes without considering any associated quality.
Thus, there is no direct coupling between the scarce (wireless)
resources at the SP and the market dynamics between the
CP, SP and end-users. In contrast, the QSD model brings this
coupling to the fore-front.
Hence, the over-arching goal of this work is to analyze and
understand the implications of the QSD model on the market
dynamics, which we believe is both timely and important. Us-
ing game-theoretic [6] tools, we study the market equilibria and
dynamics under various scenarios and assumptions involving
the three key players of the market, namely the CPs, SPs and
end users. We investigate the scenarios under which the QSD
model is plausible, and one can expect a stable outcome for
the market that involves sponsoring the quality of the content
by CPs. In addition, we discuss about the division of profit
between SPs and CPs in two cases (1) when the decision
makers do not cooperate and at least one of them is myopic
optimizer , and (2) when both cooperatively maximize the
payoff in the long-run. In the process, we devise strategies
for the CPs (respectively, SPs) to determine if they should
participate in QSD, what quality to sponsor, and how the SPs
should price their resources.
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2In our model, SPs make a portion of their resources available
for sponsorship, and price it appropriately to maximize their
payoff. Their payoff depends on monetary revenue and satis-
faction of end-users both for the non-sponsored and sponsored
content. Note that the QSD model couples market decisions
to the scarce (wireless) resources. Thus, resources allocated to
sponsored contents will affect those allocated to non-sponsored
content and hence their quality. Thus, one should consider the
impact of the quality of the two types of data (sponsored and
non-sponsored) on satisfaction of end-users.
We consider one CP and one SP. We consider that the CP has
an advertisement revenue model2, (Section II), and characterize
the myopic pricing strategies for the CP and the SP given the
quality of the content that needs to be guaranteed and the
available resource using a non-cooperative sequential game
framework (Section III). Assuming the demand for content to
be dynamic, wherein the change in the demand is dependent on
the quality end-users experience, we investigate the asymptotic
behavior of the market when at most one of the decision
makers (SP or CP) is short-sighted, i.e. not involving the
dynamics of demand in their decision making. We show that
depending on certain key parameters, such as the importance of
non-sponsored data for SPs and the parameters of the dynamic
demand, the market can be asymptotically (in long run) stable
or unstable. Furthermore, four different stable outcomes are
possible: 1. no-sponsoring, 2. maximum bit sponsoring: the
CP sponsors all the available resources, 3. minimum quality
sponsoring: the CP sponsors minimum resources to deliver a
minimum desired rate to her users, and 4. Interior solution
in which the CP sponsors more than the minimum but not
all the available resources. We characterize the conditions
under which each of these asymptotic outcomes is plausible.
In Section III-E, the effects of different market parameters on
the asymptotic outcome of the market is investigated through
numerical simulations. Note that there may exist multiple
equilibria, and a non-cooperative framework may lead to a
Pareto-inefficient outcome. Thus, when both of the decision
makers are long-sighted, it is natural to consider a coopera-
tive scheme such as a bargaining game framework. Thus, in
Section IV, we investigate the role of a CP and an SP with
long-sighted business models3 in stabilizing the market and
equilibrium selection. We characterize the Nash Bargaining
Solution (NBS) of the game to determine the profit sharing
mechanism between the SP and CP. We present the numerical
results in Section IV-B. Finally, in Section V, we summarize
the key results of the paper and comment on some of the
assumptions and their generalizations.
Related Works:
New pricing schemes in the Internet market either target
end-users or CPs. For the end-user side, different pricing
schemes have been proposed to replace the traditional flat
rate pricing [7], [8], [9]. These schemes can create additional
revenue for SPs and provide a more flexible data plan for
end-users. However, SPs are reluctant in adopting such pricing
2A CP that earns money through advertisements.
3in which decision makers maximize their payoff in long-run considering
the dynamics of the demand for the content.
schemes due to the fact that these schemes are typically not
user-friendly. Thus, SPs mainly focus on changing the pricing
structure of the CP side, for which they should deal with net-
neutrality rules.
Works related to the emerging subject of sponsored content
are scarce. In [10], [11], [12], and [13], authors investigate the
economic aspects of content sponsoring in a framework similar
to At&t sponsored data plans. Note that in At&t sponsored data
plan, the CP pays for the quantity of the data carried to the
end-users, while in our scheme the CP pays for the quality
of the data, and end-user is responsible for paying for the
quantity. We take into the account the quality of the content and
the coupling it has with scarce resources. We consider more
strategic CPs that decide on the portion of SP’s resources they
want to sponsor, based on the price SPs quote and the demand
from end-users.
This work falls in the category of economic models for a
non-neutral Internet [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [20],[19], [?].
A survey of the existing literature on the economics analysis of
non-neutral markets is presented in [21]. Most of the works in
this area study the social welfare of the market under neutrality
and non-neutrality regimes (which includes [14-21]). In these
works the decision of CPs does not depend on the demand for
the content, and simply is a take-it-or-leave-it choice, i.e. either
the CP pays for the premium quality or uses the free quality.
In addition, most of the works do not consider the coupling
between limited resources available to SPs and the strategies of
the decision makers. Exceptions are [19] and [?]. We consider
that CPs decide on the number of resources they want to
sponsor based on the dynamics of their demand. Depending on
the demand and number of resources available with the SP, the
number of sponsored resources by the CP yields a quality of
experience for users of sponsored and non-sponsored contents.
Thus, we consider the coupling between market decisions and
the limited wireless resources. Moreover, we study problems
like stability of the market and the effects of being short-
sighted or long-sighted. Therefore, we focus on one-to-one
interaction between CPs and SPs, and its implications on the
payoff of individual decision makers.
The closest work to ours is [22] in which authors study the
interaction between an SP and a CP when the CP can sponsor
a quality higher than the minimum quality under a private
contract with the SP. Their main focus is to compare the social
welfare of the sequential game when either the SP or the CP
is the leader, with the Pareto optimal outcome resulting from a
bargaining game between the SP and the CP. Authors assume
that the number of subscribers to the SP is an increasing
function of the quality it provides for the CP. In other words,
as the quality for the sponsored content enhances, end-users
of the SP become more satisfied. However, in our work, the
main focus is the coupling between the limited resources and
the quality. Thus, providing a better quality for a sponsored
content may degrade the quality of non-sponsored contents in
peak congestion times. Therefore, in our model, the satisfaction
of end-users which is a function of both sponsored and the non-
sponsored content is not necessarily increasing with respect to
the sponsored quality. This changes the nature of the problem.
3Fig. 1: Market when CP has an advertisement revenue model
II. MODEL
A. Problem Formulation:
We model the ecosystem as a market consisting of three
players: CPs, SPs, and end-users. A summary of important
symbols is presented in Table I. We focus on the interaction
between SPs and CPs, and not on the competition among SPs
and CPs. Thus the interaction between one CP and one SP is
considered. The strategy for the CP is to determine how much
resources to sponsor (i.e. quality), and the strategy of the SP is
to determine how to price her resources. Decisions are made
by the players based on an estimated demand update function
(explained later) at the beginning of every time-epoch, which
captures the typical time granularity of sponsorship decisions4.
The CP has an advertisement revenue model, and sponsors
bt resources (e.g. bits in an LTE frame) out of a total of N
resources at tth time-epoch to sponsor the average quality of
at least ζ ( bitframe ) for her content, and pays a price of pt per
resource sponsored to the SP. Thus, on average a quality of
ζ should be satisfied for the users. If not, the CP exits the
sponsorship program. Note that this does not guarantee the
quality of an individual user to be higher than ζ. An example
Schematic picture of the market in this case is presented in
Figure 1.
The CP and the SP choose their strategy at time-epoch t
after observing the previous demand, i.e. the number of end-
users desiring content from the previous epoch. Obviously, the
demand is non-negative. Note that the demand for the content
of the CP changes over time depending on the satisfaction
of users, which in turn depends on the resources that the CP
decides to sponsor and hence the quality. We suppose that the
satisfaction of users depends on the average quality, i.e. btdt
5,
4Using the estimate of the demand, players decide on their strategy to
maximize an “estimated” payoff (and not the actual one). Note that the
shorter the interval of epochs, the more accurate the estimates, and the more
inconvenient the implementation would be. We will observe that, in our
framework, the algorithm of decision making in NE would be simple. Thus,
the decision making can be done in shorter time intervals, e.g. minutes.
5Note that we are analyzing the model from the perspective of the CP and
the SP. Thus, we are assuming that the CP and the SP see the demand for
the content as a whole and want to sponsor an average sponsored quality. The
demand of the individual end-users could be potentially different from each
other.
and the demand for content updates as follows6,
dt+1 =
{
dt
(
1 + γ log
(
κu
bt
dt
))+
if dt > 0
0 if dt = 0
(1)
where z+ = max{z, 0}, dt is the demand between epoch
t and t + 1, btdt is the rate a single user receives, and
log
(
κu
bt
dt
)
models the satisfaction of end users: the higher
the rate received by users, the higher their satisfaction. The
parameter γ > 0 represents the sensitivity of end-users to
their satisfaction. A higher γ is associated with a higher rate
of change with respect to the satisfaction of users (higher
fluctuation in demand). An instance of this type of users is
customers of a streaming website like Netflix that are sensitive
to the quality they receive. Parameter κu > 0 is a constant.
Note that the total available wireless resources (for spon-
sored and non-sponsored contents) is limited (N ). This limits
the number of sponsored resources (bt) which in term deter-
mines the upperbound of resources that can be allocated to
non-sponsored contents. This is a key distinction of our work
from previous works as the limited resources available couples
the utility of end users for both sponsored and non-sponsored
content with the decisions of the market players. We assume
that the number of resources (bits) a CP can sponsor is bounded
above by Nˆ (Nˆ ≤ N ).
The utility of the CP if she chooses to enter the sponsorship
program consists of the utility she receives by sponsoring the
content minus the price she pays for sponsoring the sponsored
bits. The latter is ptbt. The former, i.e. the utility of the CP for
sponsoring the content, depends on the advertisement revenue
which in turns depends on the demand for the content as well
as the quality received by the users (throughput is btdt )
7. We
consider the utility from advertisement for the CP to be:
uad(bt) =
{
αdt log
(
κCP bt
dt
)
if dt > 0
0 if dt = 0
(2)
Note that the better the quality of advertisement, more
successful the advertisement would be, and therefore the higher
the utility that the CP receives from advertisement. Thus, the
utility of advertisement is dependent on the satisfaction of
users. This is the reason that we use a similar function to (1)
6Note that receiving a satisfactory quality, increases the chance of user
repeating the visit to the website and increases the number of new users that
are going to use the service. Therefore, a satisfactory QoS will likely increase
the demand for the data in the next session. In addition, we assume that the
increase in the demand would be slower with high rates (a diminishing return
behavior).
7Note that bt
dt
can be the quality of the content, ads, or both. One example
of CPs whose revenue depends on the quality of the ad is a CP that support
video ads, e.g. YouTube. Another example is websites loaded with several
“flash ads” for which users may have difficulty loading the ads which can
lead to the decrease of number of clicks on the ads. In addition to these CPs,
we can think about scenarios in which increasing the quality of the content
of a website (not only the ads) increases the revenue of this website. An
example of such contents are shopping websites (e.g. Amazon). Improving
the quality of the experience of users, increases the chance of spending more
time on these website. This would increase the chance of a transaction which
increases the revenue of the CP.
4for the utility of advertisement8. The constant κCP in general
can be different from κu. The parameter α is a constant that
models the the unit income of the CP for each end-user based
on the quality that the end-user receives: The higher α, the
higher the profit of the CP per rates sponsored. An example
of CPs with high α is shopping websites (e.g. Amazon) that
in contrast with streaming websites (e.g. Netflix) have a high
profit per user rate.
Thus, the utility of the CP at time t if she chooses to join
the sponsorship program is:
uCP,t(bt) = uad(bt)− ptbt (3)
To have a non-trivial problem, we assume κCP ζ > e = 2.72.
The utility of the SP at time t if she chooses to offer the
sponsorship program is the revenue she makes by sponsoring
the bits plus the users’ satisfaction function:
uSP,t(pt) = ptbt + us(bt(pt)) (4)
where the users’ satisfaction function, i.e. us(.), is a function
of the number of sponsored bits which subsequently depends
on the price pt. This function consists of two parts: (i)
the satisfaction of users for access to the sponsored content
and its quality, and (ii) the satisfaction of users when using
non-sponsored content. This function could be decreasing or
increasing depending on the users, the cell condition, etc. We
define the satisfaction function as follows9
us(bt) =

ν1dt log
(
κSP bt
dt
)
+ ν2D log
(
κSP
N − bt
D
)
(5a)
if dt > 0& bt > 0
ν2D log
(
κSP
N − bt
D
)
Otherwise (5b)
where D is the total demand for all CPs other than the strategic
CP10 and κSP is a positive constant. In addition, v1 and v2 are
constants corresponding to the weights that end-users assign
8Note that we expect a diminishing return of ad utility based on quality, i.e.
after a certain point increasing the quality would not significantly increase the
utility of advertisement. Thus, we used a log function to model the ad utility
from an end-user (log( bt
dt
)). Thus, we assume the utility of advertisement
to be
∑
dt
constant × log( bt
dt
) = constant × dt log( btdt ). If we consider a
linear dependency between quality and ad revenue, then the utility would be∑
dt
constant× bt
dt
= constant×bt. However, we believe that a function with
diminishing return would model the ad utility more closely.
9Note that in the case of no sponsoring, the demand of the CP should be
added to the demand of in the best effort categor, i.e. D in (5b) should be
substituted by dt+D. However, we assume that dt << D, i.e. the demand for
one content is much smaller than the aggregate demand for all other contents.
This often arises in practice. In Appendix H, we show that this modification
does not alter any results in essence, and the insights of the model would be
the same as before.
10We now argue why D is considered to be constant. We consider the
content of the CP that is willing to sponsor her content to be different from the
content of other CPs, i.e. no competition over the content. An example of such
CP is Youtube (for personal video streaming). This yields that the demands
for the strategic CP (that can be sponsored) and other CPs are independent
of each other. Thus, no demand will be switched from the content of the
sponsored CP to other CPs. In addition, since we assume that other CPs are
not sensitive to the quality they deliver, their demand is independent of the
quality their end-users receive. Thus, D can be considered as a constant, and
independent of the demand for the sponsored content.
Symbol Description
pt the price per unit of resources sponsored at time t
bt the number of sponsored bits in an LTE frame at time t
dt the demand between epoch t and t+ 1
ζ the minimum average quality desired by end-users
γ sensitivity of end users to the quality they receive.
α constant, the unit income
κu, κCP , κSP constants
Nˆ the number of available bits for sponsoring
N the total number of bits (resources) in an LTE frame
us(.) end-users’ satisfaction function
uad(.) CP’s advertisement profit
ν1 the weight end-users assign to the sponsored data
ν2 the weight end-users assign to the non-sponsored data
D the total demand of end-users for non-sponsored data
1
κu
the stable quality, the rate that stabilizes the demand
z &y the participation factor for the CP and SP, 1 =join, 0 =exit
TABLE I: Important Symbols
to the sponsored and non-sponsored data, respectively. We
considered the users’ satisfaction function to be a part of the
SP’s utility since it is natural to think that SPs not only care
about the money they receive for the sponsored content, but
also about the satisfaction (or the overall quality of experience)
of end-users for both sponsored and non-sponsored content11.
Another reason for considering the satisfaction of users is the
regulatory policies on the quality of the experience of users
who use non-sponsored contents. Thus, v1 and v2 can be
determined by the SP or the regulator12. The higher v2v1 , the
higher would be the importance of the non-sponsored content.
Note that, despite the dependencies between κu, κCP , and
κSP , these parameters could be potentially different. For ex-
ample, the ad revenue is paid by an advertiser. This advertiser
may value the quality of the content delivered to the end-users
different from the end-users. Thus, for this reason, κCP might
be different from κu. We do not mandate the parameters to be
different from each other and they can be potentially equal..
Recall that we assume if dt = 0 or one of the decision
makers exits the sponsoring program, then the game ends, and
we have a stable outcome of no-sponsoring.
11Note that in reality, end-users can switch between SPs if they are not
satisfied, and this incurs loss to the SP they leave. To capture this, we need
to consider the competition between SPs which makes the analysis much
more complicated. Instead, we consider only one SP and the user satisfaction
function to be an element in the utility of the SP. This captures some aspects
of competition over end-users between SPs, without complicating the analysis
unnecessarily.
12 Although in the current set up, the regulator does not provide quality
constraints for the SP, one can envision that in a non-neutral framework, the
regulator imposes explicit or implicit constraints on the behavior of SP toward
the sponsored and non-sponsored data. In other words, in a non-neutral regime,
it is natural to suppose that the regulator forces the SPs to take into the
account the satisfaction of their users regardless of the fact that they are using
sponsored or non-sponsored data. Thus, the SP wants to maximize her utility
(which depends on the money collected from the CPs) given some constraints.
In this sense, including the satisfaction of users with parameters v1 and v2
is similar to the Lagrangian penalty (reward) function by which we solve the
mentioned maximization. Note that eventually v1 and v2 is set by the SP and
not the regulator. However, their value depends on the restriction determined
by the regulator. Therefore, a strict net-neutrality rule, mandates the SP to
assign high weights to the quality of the content of non-sponsored data, i.e.
high v2.
5B. Preliminary Notations and Definitions:
In this section, we define some notations that we use
throughout the paper. Section-specific notations and definitions
are presented in the corresponding sections.
Note that, we model the problem of QSD as a sequential
game if at least one of the decision makers is short-sighted,
and as a bargaining game when both CPs and SPs are long-
sighted.
Definition 1: Short-Sighted (Myopic) Decision Maker: A
decision maker is short-sighted if she maximizes the myopic
payoff knowing the present demand (dt),13 i.e. does not involve
the evolution of demand (1) in her decision making.
Definition 2: Long-Sighted Decision Maker: A decision
maker is long-sighted if she maximizes her payoff in long-
run considering the current demand and the evolution of the
demand in (1).14
Since we consider an evolving demand of end-users based
on their satisfaction, one of the contributions of this paper is
to characterize the stability conditions of the market.
Definition 3: Stable Market: We say that the market is
stable if and only if the demand of end-users is asymptotically
stable, i.e. if and only if:
lim
t→∞ |dt+1 − dt| = 0
Note that it is not apriori clear that the demand would be
stable. In fact, we see that in the short-sighted scenario, under
certain parameters, the demand is unstable. The definition of
the stable market and (1) yield the following lemma that is
useful in determining the stable outcome of the market.
Lemma 1: The market is stable if and only if the quality
bt
dt
t→∞−−−→ 1κu is sponsored for end-users.
Proof: The result follows immediately from (1).
Definition 4: Stable Quality and Stable Demand: We refer
to bd =
1
κu
as the stable quality, and d = κub as the stable
demand.
III. SEQUENTIAL FRAMEWORK: SPNE ANALYSIS
In the sequential game framework, we seek a Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) using backward induction.
Definition 5: Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE):
A strategy is an SPNE if and only if it constitutes a Nash
Equilibrium (NE) of every subgame of the game.
Definition 6: Backward Induction: Characterizing the equi-
librium strategies starting from the last stage of the game and
proceeding backward.
In this section, we first present the stages of the game
(Section III-A). Then, in Section III-B, we consider the case in
which both the CP and the SP have a short-sighted (myopic)
business model and play the one-shot game infinitely. We
characterize the equilibrium strategies and asymptotic outcome
of the game. When parameters of the market are such that
a stable sponsoring outcome is not plausible, considering
13Mathematical definitions for the optimization solved by the short-sighted
SP and CP are presented in Equations (6) and (7), respectively.
14Mathematical definitions for the payoff of the long-sighted SP and CP
are presented in Equations (11) and (12), respectively.
decision makers with long-sighted vision about the market may
ensure a stable sponsoring outcome for the market. Thus, in
Sections III-C and III-D, using the sequential framework, we
investigate the cases in which either one of the SP and the CP
is long-sighted and the other is short-sighted. In Section III-E,
we present numerical results and discuss about them.
A. Stages of the Game:
We suppose a complete information setting for the game.
The timing of the game at time epoch t is as follow:
1) The SP decides on (1) offering the sponsorship pro-
gram, yt ∈ {0, 1} (with yt = 1 implying offering) and
(2) if yt = 1, on the price per sponsored bit in an LTE
frame, pt, by solving the following optimization:
max
pt
uSP,t(pt), (6)
where uSP,t(pt) is defined in (24). The SP sets yt = 0
if u∗SP,t < v2D log(κSP
N
D ) (the payoff is less than no-
sponsoring payoff) or dt = 0, and yt = 1 otherwise,
where u∗SP,t is the optimum outcome of the optimiza-
tion15.
2) The CP decides on (1) whether to participate in the
sponsorship program, zt ∈ {0, 1} (with zt = 1 implying
participation) and (2) if zt = 1 on the number of bits
in an LTE frame (i.e. quality) she wants to sponsor, bt,
by solving the following optimization problem:
max
bt>0
uCP,t(bt)
s.t.
bt
dt
≥ ζ
bt ≤ Nˆ
(7)
where uCP,t is defined in (3). The first constraint is
associated with the minimum quality that the CP wants
to deliver to her end-users. The second constraint puts
an upperbound to the number of bits that a CP can
sponsor in an LTE frame. The CP sets zt = 0 if u∗CP,t <
0 or dt = 0, and zt = 1 otherwise, where u∗CP,t is the
optimum outcome of the optimization16. In addition,
the CP exits the sponsorship program, i.e zt = 0, if
there is no feasible solution for (7). Note that, dt =(
1 + γ log
(
κu
bt−1
dt−1
))+
, and is known as the history
of the game is known.
We use the Backward Induction method to find the Sub
game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of the game. Thus,
first, we find the best response strategy of the CP in the second
stage given the strategy of the SP in the first stage and the
history of the game. This allows the CP to decide on (1) joining
the sponsorship program and also on (2) the number of bits to
sponsor. Then, using this best response strategy and the history,
the SP chooses (1) whether to launch the sponsorship program
or not, and (2) the optimum per-bit price, pt, in the first stage.
15Note that we consider that in the case of indifference u∗SP,t = 0, y
∗
t = 1
16Note that we consider that in the case of indifference u∗CP,t = 0, z
∗
t = 1
6Fig. 2: The optimum strategy of the CP presented in theorem 1
for ζ1 (blue) and ζ2 (red) when 0 < dt ≤ Nˆζ and ζ2 > ζ1.
B. Short-Sighted CP, Short-Sighted SP
CP’s Strategy: In the second stage, knowing the decision
of the SP at stage one, the CP solves (7) at each time-epoch
t.
Theorem 1: Equilibrium Strategy of Stage 2: The strat-
egy of the CP in the SPNE is as follows:
if 0 < dt ≤ Nˆ
ζ
,
(b∗t , z
∗
t ) =

(Nˆ , 1) if pt ≤ αdt
Nˆ
(αdt
pt
, 1) if αdt
Nˆ
≤ pt ≤ αζ
(ζdt, 1) if αζ ≤ pt ≤ α log(κCP ζ)ζ
(−, 0) if pt > α log(κCP ζ)ζ
(8)
if dt >
Nˆ
ζ
or dt = 0, (b∗t , z
∗
t ) = (−, 0) (9)
Remark 1: It is intuitive that the number of sponsored bits
is a decreasing function of the price per sponsored bit. In
addition, one can expect that if the price per sponsored bit is
lower (respectively, higher) than a threshold, the CP sponsors
all the available bits (respectively, the amount to satisfy only
the minimum quality requested by the end-users). Moreover,
if the price is so high that in case of sponsoring the CP
receives a negative payoff, the CP would exit the sponsoring
program. This also characterize another threshold for the price
per sponsored bit. In theorem 1, we confirm the intuitions,
and go beyond it by characterizing the thresholds on the price
per sponsored bit and optimum number of sponsored bits in
different regions characterized by the thresholds. Figure 2
illustrates the optimum strategy of the CP and the regions
described in the theorem for two different values of ζ. Note
that the higher the minimum quality requested by end-users,
the lower the thresholds on pt after which the CP sponsors
only the minimum quality or exits the sponsorship program.
In order to prove the theorem, we apply the first order
optimality condition since the utility of the CP is concave.
The proof is presented in the Appendix.
SP’s Strategy: Now, having the optimum strategy of the CP
in stage 2, we can find the optimum strategy for the SP:
Theorem 2: Equilibrium Strategy of Stage 1: The opti-
mum strategies of the SP are:
if 0 < dt ≤ Nˆ
ζ
,
(p∗t , y
∗
t ) =
{ (
argmax{uSP,t (pt) : pt ∈ P ∗}, 1
)
if uSP,t (p∗t ) ≥ uSP,0
(−, 0) if uSP,t (p∗t ) < uSP,0
if dt >
Nˆ
ζ
or dt = 0, (p∗t , y
∗
t ) = (−, 0)
(10)
where P ∗ = {αdt
Nˆ
, α log(κCP ζ)ζ , α
ν1dt+ν2D
ν1N
} is the set of
candidate optimum pricing strategies, and uSP,0 is consid-
ered to be the utility of the SP in case of no-sponsoring,
i.e. v2D log(κSP ND ). In addition, the necessary condition for
the candidate stable point α ν1dt+ν2Dν1N to be an optimum is
αdt
Nˆ
≤ α ν1dt+ν2Dν1N ≤ αζ . Note that the variable yt determines
whether the SP offers the sponsorship program or not, with
yt = 1 implying the offering.
Remark 2: The immediate plausible range for the price per
sponsored bit that one can think of is the interval between the
lowest price that makes the CP to sponsor all the available
bits and the highest price that makes the CP to sponsor only
to satisfy the minimum desired quality. In Theorem 2, first, we
narrow down this interval to prices between the highest price
that makes the CP to sponsor all the available bits and the
highest price that makes the CP to sponsor only to satisfy the
minimum desired quality. Then, we characterize the interior
optimum price. This choice is conditional on getting a payoff
greater than or equal to the utility of the SP in case of no-
sponsoring. Otherwise, the SP exits the sponsorship program.
In order to prove the theorem, we use the monotonic
behavior of the utility of the SP in some regions, and apply
the first order optimality condition for the remaining regions.
The proof is presented in the Appendix.
Corollary 1: Choosing the price α log(κCP ζ)ζ by the SP, i.e.
the highest price by which the CP sponsors only to guarantee
the minimum quality, renders the utility of the CP to be zero,
and the CP to be indifferent between joining or not joining the
sponsorship program.
Proof: Results follow from (3), and that from Theorem 2,
when pt =
α log(κCP ζ)
ζ , d > 0 and bt = ζdt (from Theorem 1).
Outcome of the Game: Now that we have characterized the
SPNE at each time-epoch for a short-sighted CP and SP, the
next step is to analyze the asymptotic behaviour of the market
given the demand update function (1) and considering the one-
shot game to be repeated infinitely. The goal is to characterize
the asymptotically stable 5-tuple equilibrium outcome of the
game, i.e. (d, y, p, z, b) (table I), if it were to exist. In the
next Theorem, all possible asymptotically stable outcomes are
listed. However, the existence of such a stable outcome is not
guaranteed, and the market can be unstable in some cases.
Theorem 3: The possible asymptotically stable outcomes of
the game are:
1) (−, 0,−, 0,−): no sponsoring is offered, none taken.
2)
(
κuNˆ , 1, ακu, 1, Nˆ
)
: the maximum bit sponsoring; if
this is the stable outcome then κu ≤ 1ζ .
73)
(
d, 1, α log(κCP ζ)ζ , 1, ζd
)
: the minimum quality sponsor-
ing; if this is the stable outcome then κu = 1ζ and
0 < d ≤ Nˆζ .
4)
(
Nκu − ν2ν1D, 1, ακu, 1, N − ν2κuν1D
)
: the interior
stable points; if this is the stable outcome, then κu ≤ 1ζ
and 0 < b = N − ν2κuν1D ≤ Nˆ .
Remark 3: Since the CP is shortsighted, in every stable
outcome of the game, the strategy of the CP would be a myopic
optimum strategy. Thus, using Theorem 1, one can expect the
strategy of the CP to take one of the four possibilities in a
stable outcome: (1) no sponsoring (2) sponsoring the maximum
amount available (3) sponsoring only to satisfy the minimum
required quality, or (4) sponsoring an optimum interior amount
of bits. Subsequently, depending on the strategy of the CP,
Theorem 2 characterizes the stable strategy of the SP. In order
to prove the theorem we use Lemma 1. The proof is presented
in the Appendix.
Corollary 2: There is no stable outcome involving spon-
soring for the game if the stable quality is smaller than the
minimum quality set by the CP, i.e. 1κu < ζ.
Remark 4: Unlike other plausible stable outcomes, the third
possible stable point, i.e.
(
d, 1, α log(κCP ζ)ζ , 1, ζd
)
when ζ =
1
κu
, can assume a range of different values. Whenever the SP
sets p = α log(κCP ζ)ζ , the CP sets
bt
dt
= ζ, and the market
will be stable. By choosing that price, the SP ensures that she
will extract all the profit of the CP and makes her indifferent
between joining the sponsorship program and opting out, i.e.
uCP (b) = 0 (using Corollary 1).
In the next theorem, we find the stable demand that maxi-
mizes the payoff of the SP when she chooses the third stable
point, i.e. the minimum quality.
Theorem 4: Let d∗ = Nζ − 1(α+ν1) log(κSP ζ) . The payoff
of the SP when the 5-tuple
(
d, 1, α log(κCP ζ)ζ , 1, ζd
)
(the
minimum quality stable point) is the stable outcome of the
market is maximized when either (1) d = min{d∗, Nˆζ } and
d∗ ≥ 0, or (2) d = 0 and d∗ < 0.
The proof of the theorem is presented in the appendix.
In the next sections, we investigate the case in the SP is
long-sighted and the CP is short-sighted.
C. Long-Sighted SP, Short-Sighted CP
A long-sighted SP sets the per-bit sponsorship fee in order
to achieve a stable market, i.e. a stable demand for the content,
and also to maximize the payoff in the long-run:
USP,Long Run(~p) = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
uSP,t(pt) (11)
In this scenario, the SP is the leader of the game and
therefore can set the equilibrium of the game individually by
knowing that the CP is a myopic optimizer unit and follows
the results in Theorem 1. Note that the long-sighted SP wants
to asymptotically set a strategy that given the strategy of the
CP, yields the highest profit. Thus, even with a long-sighted
SP, the optimum strategy follows Theorem 2, and we can use
the result in Theorem 3.
The difference between this case and the previous case is the
ability of the long-sighted SP to choose between the candidate
stable points in Theorem 3. Thus, the SP sets appropriate
sponsoring fees at the beginning of the sponsoring program in
order to asymptotically lock the stable outcome of the market
in the chosen equilibrium.
Note that from Theorem 3, when κu > 1ζ , there is no
stable sponsoring outcome, and if κu < 1ζ , depending on the
parameters of the market, the stable point 2, i.e. maximum bit
sponsoring, or 4, i.e. interior stable point, is chosen by the
SP. In this case, if ν2, i.e. the importance of non-sponsored
data for end-users and SP, is high enough, the stable point 4 is
chosen and set by the SP. In addition, increasing the number of
resources available with the SP, i.e. N , makes the stable point
2, i.e. maximum bit sponsoring, to yield the highest payoff,
and thus is chosen by the SP. In the next theorem, we prove
that when κu = 1ζ , the stable point 3 yields the highest payoff.
Theorem 5: If κu = 1ζ , the minimum quality stable point,
i.e.
(
d, 1, α log(κCP ζ)ζ , 1, ζd
)
, with the demand characterized
in Theorem 4 yields the highest payoff for the SP.
Remark 5: Note that in a minimum quality stable point, the
CP is indifferent, i.e. all profit of the CP is extracted by the SP.
Therefore, we can expect this stable outcome to be the most
favorable for the SP. Thus, a long-sighted SP sets this stable
point as the asymptotic outcome of the market when κu = 1ζ .
The proof of the theorem is presented in the appendix.
D. Short-Sighted SP, Long-Sighted CP
Consider a CP that chooses bt in order to achieve a stable
demand and to maximize the payoff in the long-run:
UCP,Long Run(~b) = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
uCP,t(bt) (12)
In the next theorem, we prove that for a long-sighted CP, the
maximum bit sponsorship yields the highest payoff amongst
the stable outcomes characterized in Theorem 3. Note that
if the CP sponsors all the available units at the start of the
sponsoring program, the sudden increase in the demand may
push the market to the stable outcome of no sponsoring. Thus,
given that the SP is short-sighted, the CP sets the number of
bits for sponsoring appropriately over time, in order to achieve
the demand of κuNˆ eventually. With this demand and b = Nˆ ,
the market would be stable. However, note that not the SP
is the leader of the game and may chooses a price other than
ακu, i.e. the price in the maximum bit sponsoring. In this case,
the CP cannot set the stable outcome she prefers. Thus, the CP
is forced to set a stable outcome that is also preferable for a
short-sighted SP.
Theorem 6: The 5-tuple plausible stable sponsoring points,
characterized in Theorem 3, in a decreasing order of the utility
they yield to the CP are: maximum bit sponsorship, interior
stable point, and minimum quality.
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sion Makers is Long-Sighted, when κu = 1ζ
Remark 6: In order to establish the results, note that the
stable point of no sponsoring is not considered a sponsoring
stable point. Thus not listed in the theorem. In addition, since
the CP is indifferent in the minimum quality stable point, this
point should be the least favorite one for the CP. The ordering
of the maximum bit and the interior stable points follows from
the fact that the payoff of the CP is strictly increasing in those
outcomes. The proof is presented in the Appendix.
E. Numerical Results
In this section, we consider at least one of the SP and the
CP to have a short-sighted model, and investigate the effects
of ζ, κu, v2, N , and γ on the asymptotic outcome of the
market. The fixed parameters considered are ν1 = 1, Nˆ = 25,
D = 50, κSP = κCP = 10, and ζ = 0.3. We observe the
effect of important parameters such as κu, the sensitivity of
the demand to the quality (γ), the weight an SP assigns to non-
sponsored data (ν2), and the total number of available bits in
an LTE frame (N ) on the asymptotic outcome of the market.
Market asymptotic outcomes for the case of κu = 1ζ
when both decision makers are short-sighted and when one
of them is long-sighted are presented in Figures 3 and 4,
respectively. Similar plots for the case of κu = 12ζ <
1
ζ
are presented in Figures 5 and 6, respectively. Recall from
Theorem 3 that the asymptotic stable outcome of the game is
one the four candidates: 1. No-Sponsoring, 2. Maximum bit
sponsoring, 3. Minimum quality, and 4. Interior stable point.
In the figures, each of the numbers are corresponding to one
of the candidates. We also denote the unstable outcome by 0.
Next, we discuss about the effect of the framework and
parameters on the asymptotic outcome of the game:
Impact of a decision-maker with long-sighted model:
Note that in both cases κu = 1ζ and κu <
1
ζ , the outcome
Fig. 5: Market Asymptotic Outcomes with Short-Sighted De-
cision Makers, when κu < 1ζ
Fig. 6: Market Asymptotic Outcomes when One of the Deci-
sion Makers is Long-Sighted, when κu < 1ζ
of the market is independent of the CP or the CP being long-
sighted or the SP being long-sighted. The reason is that in
the sequential game the SP is the leader of the game. Thus,
although a long-sighted SP can set the stable outcome she
prefers in the long-run, a long-sighted CP cannot enforce the
most preferred stable outcome, and should choose the stable
outcome that is also preferable for the SP. This yields the same
asymptotic outcome for the market as the case that the SP is
long-sighted.
Impact of the minimum quality (ζ) and the stable
quality ( 1κu ): Theorem 3 implies that depending on the relation
between the minimum quality set by the CP (ζ) and the stable
quality ( 1κu ), the market has different stability outcomes in the
short-sighted scenario. We seek to identify the stable outcomes
that arise in each different parameter ranges:
• Using Corollary 2, If the CP over-provisions the minimum
quality for the satisfaction of users (ζ > 1κu ), there is no
stable sponsoring outcome since the demand of users grows
drastically forcing the SP and CP to exit the sponsoring
program. Thus, we do not study this case through simulations.
• If the CP under-provisions the minimum quality (ζ < 1κu ),
simulation results in Figure 5 reveal that the market is set on
the maximum bit sponsoring stable outcome for a particular
range of parameters. However, the market is unstable or has
the stable outcome of no-sponsoring for the rest of parameters.
• If the CP sets the minimum quality equal to the stable
quality (ζ = 1κu ), the market is set either on the no-sponsoring
or the minimum quality stable outcomes. Comparing Figures 3,
4, 5, and 6 reveals that in the case of κu = 1ζ , the market is
more likely to have a stable outcome that involves sponsoring.
Impact of the sensitivity of the demand to the quality,
γ: Note that, in Figures 3 and 5, and in general, increasing
the value of γ shifts the stable outcome of the market from
sponsoring to no-sponsoring. The exception is a range of v2
9for the case κu = 1ζ , which we explain about when we discuss
about the impact of v2 later.
Therefore, in a market with short-sighted entities, the sen-
sitivity of the demand to the quality, i.e. γ, greatly influences
the stability of the market. When γ is high, the satisfaction
and subsequently the demand of end-users increases/decreases
drastically with small changes in the rate perceived by them.
Thus, players would exit the sponsorship program since the
demand may go down to zero or the demand may exceed
dmax =
Nˆ
ζ
17, i.e. the jump in the demand decreases the quality
received by the users below the requested minimum quality (ζ)
which leads the CP to stick to the best-effort scenario. On the
other hand, if γ is small, the market is more likely to be set
on a sponsoring stable outcome.
Thus, in order to have a stable outcome of sponsoring, γ
should be sufficiently small. Note that this parameter is small
for a CP whose users are less sensitive to the quality they
receive, such as shopping websites. This is in contrast with
streaming websites whose users are sensitive to the quality
(high γ). The parameter γ is also small for a CP which has
a well-established end-user side, i.e. a more stable demand,
such as Google, in contrast with the emerging CPs and start ups
whose demand usually fluctuate more. Thus, in a short-sighted
setting, the QSD may not be a viable option for streaming
websites and emerging CPs.
In addition, note that the effect of γ would be canceled if
one of the decision makers is long-sighted. This implies that
in QSD framework, CPs with volatile demand (high γ) should
be long-sighted to have a market with a stable outcome that
involves sponsoring the content.
Impact of the importance of non-sponsored contents,
ν2: The parameter v2 being large, when v1 is normalized to
one, represents the fact that the SP assigns more weight to the
satisfaction of users for using non-sponsored content. Thus,
the SP wants to restrict the number of bits she offers for
sponsoring, and the best strategy for the SP is to set her per-bit
sponsorship fee high enough so that the CP sponsors a smaller
number of bits. Thus, we expect the market to have a stable
outcome of no-sponsoring when v2 is high.
Results in Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6 confirm that the market
has the stable outcome of no-sponsoring when v2 is large.
One of the differences between the cases κu = 1ζ and κu <
1
ζ
is that when κu = 1ζ , for a certain range of v2, the stable
sponsoring outcome is 3, i.e. the minimum quality stable
outcome, regardless of γ, i.e. the sensitivity of the demand
to the quality. Next, we explain the reason for this behavior.
Note that, as we mentioned, v2 being high is associated with
lower bits sponsored. Thus, for a certain range of v2, we expect
the CP to start the sponsoring program with a quality near
the minimum quality (since the CP wants to sponsor at least
the minimum quality). In the case that κu = 1ζ , (1) implies
that the demand increases more slowly (the logarithm in the
expression is smaller). Thus, the effect of γ is not significant,
and the market can be stabilized on the minimum quality stable
point regardless of γ. However, this does not happen for the
17the highest number of end-users that can be satisfied with the minimum
quality.
case of κu < 1ζ , since in this case, from (1), the demand of
end-users diminishes to zero18, and the market is set on the
stable outcome of no-sponsoring.
Impact of total available resources, N : Figures 3, 4, 5, and
6 reveal that increasing the number of available resources (N )
stretches the regions. In other words, as N increases, results
would be similar to that of smaller v2’s.
For example, in Figure 3, increasing the number of available
bits (resources) increases the area of no-sponsoring region for
small v2. This is counter-intuitive since one can expect that
increasing the amount of available resources should facilitate
sponsoring the content. This counter-intuitive result is due to
the fact that by increasing N , the value of the SP for each bit
decreases and the SP sets a lower sponsoring fee. This leads
to sponsoring more bits by the CP which leads to a significant
increase in the demand for the content when γ is large. This
derives the market to the point of no-sponsoring. Therefore,
the outcome is the same as the case in which v2 is very small:
the minimum quality stable point when γ is small and no-
sponsoring when γ is large.
Impact of v1 and v2 on the social welfare: If we define the
social welfare of the QSD regime as the sum of the payoffs of
the CP and the SP19, then important parameters for determining
the social welfare of the system are v1 and v2 (can be imposed
by the regulator), and D. In this case, if v2v1 or D are high, i.e.
when the weight on the content of a non-sponsored content is
high, then the SP restricts the number of bits she offers for
sponsoring by quoting a high sponsorship fee (as explained
before). Thus, either the CP reserves a smaller number of bits
or exits the sponsorship program. In either cases, the outcome
would be aligned with maximizing the social welfare. Thus,
v1 and v2 can be imposed by the regulator to control the social
welfare.
Remark 7: Figure 5 and 6 illustrate that the stable point
4, i.e. interior stable point, does not emerge, and only stable
points 1 and 2 occur. In other words, in a stable outcome, when
stakeholders of the market are short-sighted, either the CP
sponsors all the available resources or no sponsoring occurs.
Note that in the stable point 4, the number of bits sponsored
by the CP in the equilibrium is N − ν2κuν1D. In addition, a
stable sponsoring 5-tuple occurs only when ν2 is small which
makes N− ν2κuν1D > Nˆ for a wide range of parameters. Thus,
the stable point 4 does not emerge in many scenarios. One
can argue that by decreasing N or increasing D, we may
have a scenario in which N − ν2κuν1D < Nˆ . However, note
these changes, is similar to having a large v2. Thus, similar
to previous arguments, in this case, the SP is willing to set a
price so high that leads the CP and market to a no-sponsoring
outcome. Therefore, again in the regions that support an
18Note that in this case the logarithm in (1) is negative for a quality near
the minimum quality.
19Note that the payoff of the SP includes a term for users’ satisfaction
function that captures the welfare of EUs for sponsored and non-sponsored
contents (possibly with constants different from v1 and v2). In addition, the
effect of the model on other CPs is also hidden in the users’ satisfaction
function (the term v2D log(κSP
N−bt
D
)). Thus, sum of the utility of the CP
and the SP (with possibly different v1 and v2) is a good indicator of the social
welfare.
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interior sponsoring solution, i.e. when N − ν2κuν1D < Nˆ , the
stable outcome 4 would not occur. None of the parameters we
considered results in such a stable outcome.
In the next section, using a bargaining framework, we
investigate the scenario in which the decision makers have a
long-sighted model, i.e. consider the effect of their decisions
on the evolution of the demand and subsequently their payoff.
IV. BARGAINING FRAMEWORK: NBS ANALYSIS
In the previous section, we proved that a long-sighted CP
and SP can prefer different stable outcomes, i.e. the stable
outcomes that yield the highest payoff for them. If both
decision makers are long-sighted, since multiple asymptotic
outcomes are plausible, playing a sequential game may lead to
a Pareto-inefficient outcome in the long-run20. Therefore, when
both of the decision makers are long-sighted, it is natural to
consider a bargaining game framework21. A bargaining game
provides the framework to model the scenario in which two
selfish agents can cooperatively select an equilibrium outcome
(possibly among multiple equilibria) when non-cooperation,
i.e. disagreement, yields Pareto-inefficient results Note that
both cases (multiple Nash equilibria and Pareto-inefficient
outcome) occur in our modeling in Section III when at least
one of the decision makers is short-sighted. After selecting the
equilibrium, the division of profits can be characterized using
the bargaining game frameworks considering the bargaining
power of each decision maker.
In Section IV-A, we formulate and analyze the bargaining
game. In Section IV-B, we present numerical results for this
framework and discuss about the results.
A. Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS)
Thus, we formulate the interaction between the CP and the
SP as a bargaining game, and use the Nash Bargaining Solution
(NBS) to characterize the bargaining solution to the problem
when both the SP and the CP are long-sighted.
Definition 7: Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS): is the
unique solution ( in our case the tuple of the payoffs of the CP
and the SP) that satisfies the four “reasonable” axioms (Invari-
ant to affine transformations, Pareto optimality, Independence
of irrelevant alternatives, and Symmetry) characterized in [23].
20 The strategies of the SP and the CP are Pareto-inefficient in the long-
run if at least one of the CP or the SP can increase her payoff, by changing
her strategy, without decreasing the other player’s payoff. An example of an
inefficient outcome that occurs in our model is when v2 is small and γ is
large and both players are short-sighted. According to Figure 3 the asymptotic
outcome of the game would be the no-sponsoring outcome. On the other hand,
in Figure 4, with the same parameters, when one of the decision makers is
long-sighted (which means that she chooses different strategies to maximize
her long-run payoff), the asymptotic outcome of the market would be the
minimum quality sponsoring outcome in which the SP receives a strictly higher
payoff than the previous case. Thus, the outcome of the sequential game, can
be Pareto inefficient in the long-run.
21We can also consider a bargaining game when decision makers are short-
sighted. However, in this paper, we consider two extreme scenarios: (1) non-
cooperation/at least one decision maker short-sighted and (2) cooperation/both
long-sight-sighted, and compare the outcome of the market in these two
extreme cases.
Let 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 be the relative bargaining power of the CP
over SP: the higher w, more powerful is the bargaining power
of a CP. In addition, uCP and uSP denote the payoff of the
CP and SP respectively, and dCP and dSP denote the payoff
each decision maker receives in case of disagreement, i.e.
disagreement payoff. In order to characterize the disagreement
payoffs, we assume that in case of disagreement, the SP and the
CP will interact as short-sighted entities playing the sequential
game previously described22. Thus, the disagreement payoffs
can be found by determining the asymptotic status of the
market: the asymptotic payoff of the CP and the SP if the
market is asymptotically stable, or the average payoffs if the
market is unstable. Note that the value of the disagreement
payoff for the CP and the SP can have an effect similar to the
bargaining power (w for the CP and 1− w for the SP).
Using standard game theoretic results in [23], the pair
of u∗CP and u
∗
SP can be identified as the Nash bargaining
solution of the problem if and only if it solves the following
optimization problem:
max
uCP ,uSP
(uCP − dCP )w(uSP − dSP )1−w
s.t.
(uCP , uSP ) ∈ U
(uCP , uSP ) ≥ (dCP , dSP )
(13)
where U is the set of feasible payoff pairs. Note that the long-
sighted SP and CP want to set a stable market in the long-run23,
and based on Lemma 1 in a stable outcome bd =
1
κu
. Thus,
the expressions for uCP and uSP in a stable outcome (using
(3) and (24)) are functions of the demand (d) and as follows:
uCP (d) = uad(d)− p d
κu
(14)
uSP (d) = p
d
κu
+ us(d) (15)
where uad(d) = αd log(κCPκu ) is the advertisement profit for
the CP, and us(d) = ν1d log(κCPκu ) + ν2D log(κSP
N− dκu
D ) is
the satisfaction of the end-users of the SP. In addition, p dκu is
the side-payment transferred from the CP to the SP in exchange
of securing a quality of 1κu for the demand (d). Note that in
Section II, we introduced uad(.) and us(.) as functions of the
number of sponsored bits (b). Here, we redefine them to be
functions of demand (d) since in a stable outcome d = κub.
Thus, the maximization (13) is over d > 0 and p. In addition,
note that the maximum demand that can be satisfied with
maximum available resources of Nˆ to provide the quality of
1
κu
is κuNˆ (d = κub ≤ κuNˆ ), which constitutes the feasible
22The reason is that if in the case of disagreement, the CP and the SP
continue their selfish non-cooperative behavior, they can obtain a payoff higher
than or equal to the payoff of no-sponsoring. The inequality is strict for the
cases that a sequential game yields a sponsoring outcome.
23An unstable market makes it difficult for the CP and the SP to make
decisions, predict the demand, or manage the network. Thus, an unstable
market has its implicit costs for the CP and the SP. This is the reason that we
assumed that the CP and the SP want to set an stable market.
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set. Thus the maximization is,
max
d,p
(uCP − dCP )w(uSP − dSP )1−w
s.t.
0 ≤ d ≤ Nˆκu
uCP ≥ dCP
uSP ≥ dSP
(16)
We define p∗ and d∗ to be the optimum solution of (16).
Note that p∗ and d∗ characterize the optimum division of profit
(u∗CP and u
∗
SP ) and thus the NBS. In addition, we define the
aggregate excess profit to be the additional profit yielded from
the cooperation in the bargaining framework:
Definition 8: Aggregate Excess Profit (uexcess): The aggre-
gate excess profit is defined as follows:
uexcess = uCP −dCP +uSP −dSP = uad−dCP +us−dSP
(17)
Note that uexcess in independent of p and is only a function of
d. We define u∗excess = uexcess|d=d∗ . Note that the bargaining
would only occur if u∗excess > 0, i.e. the framework creates
additional joint profit that can be divided between the SP and
the CP. Thus, henceforth, we characterize the NBS for the case
that u∗excess > 0. We use uexcess in the following theorem:
Theorem 7: If u∗excess > 0, the optimum solution
of the optimization (16) is (d∗, p∗) in which d∗ =
arg max0≤d≤Nˆκu uexcess, and p
∗ is:
p∗ =
κu
d
(
(1− w)(u∗ad − dCP )− w(u∗s − dSP )
)
=
κu
d
(
(u∗ad − dCP )− wu∗excess
) (18)
where u∗ad = uad|d=d∗ , u∗s = us|d=d∗ .
Remark 8: The theorem characterizes p∗ and d∗ which
directly lead to the NBS (using (14) and (15)), i.e. (u∗CP , u
∗
SP ).
Based on the theorem, before splitting the profit, the SP and
the CP cooperatively set a stable quality and subsequently a
stable demand to maximize the aggregate excess profit, uexcess
by solving the concave maximization problem (maxd uexcess)
with the single parameter d. Subsequently, they decide the split
of the additional profit, i.e. the side payment paid to the SP by
the CP (p∗ d
∗
κu
), based on (18) which depends on the bargaining
power each has (w and 1 − w). The proof of Theorem is
presented in the Appendix.
Remark 9: As we mentioned before, the value of the dis-
agreement payoffs can also play a similar role as the bargaining
power (w). From (18): dCP ↑⇒ p ↓, and dSP ↑⇒ p ↑.
Remark 10: Price vs. Bargaining Power: The price per
sponsored bit (18) is a decreasing function of w , i.e. the
bargaining power of the CP: the higher the bargaining power
of the CP the lower the side payment paid to the SP. It follows
from (18) that there exists a threshold on w, wt =
u∗ad−dCP
u∗excess
,
such that when w > wt, p∗ < 0, when w < wt, p∗ > 0,
and when w = wt, p∗ = 0. In other words, for the CP
with a bargaining power higher than the threshold wt, the
flow of money is reversed, and the SP pays the CP. This
counter-intuitive case occurs either due to a high bargaining
power of the CP (high w), or in the scenario that the SP gain
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Fig. 7: The percentage of increase in the utility of the CP when
κu =
1
ζ with respect to v2 for different values of ζ.
significantly more than the CP from the cooperative scenario
(u∗excess >> u
∗
ad−dCP , i.e. low wt). For example, a powerful
CP, e.g. Google, which already has a large established demand
for the content might be reluctant to cooperate with the SP
unless the SP pays some of the additional profit to it.
B. Numerical Results
Now, consider the SP and the CP with long-sighted business
model that play a bargaining game as described in this Sec-
tion. We investigate the effects of bargaining and cooperation
between the CP and the SP in increasing the utility of each of
them and stabilizing the market. In addition, we discuss about
the relation between the number of available resources (N )
and the Nash bargaining price (p∗).
We consider w = 0.5, i.e. the CP and the SP have the same
bargaining power, and the values of v1, Nˆ , D, κSP , and κCP
to be the same as those considered in Section III-E.
First, we plot the percentage of increase in the payoff of the
CP and the SP after bargaining versus v2 for different values
of ζ when κu = 1ζ in Figures 7 and 8. The percentage of
increase in the utility after bargaining is defined as follows:
increase (percentage) =
utility after bargaining-utility before bargaining
utility after bargaining
× 100
(19)
Note that when the utility before bargaining is zero and
the utility after bargaining is positive, then the increase in the
utility, using (19), is 100 percent, and this value is zero if the
utility after bargaining is equal to the utility before bargaining.
Results in Figure 7 reveal that the percentage of increase
in the payoff of the CP is either zero or 100. Note that
when κu = 1ζ , the market either has a stable outcome
of no sponsoring or a stable outcome of minimum quality
sponsoring. In both cases, the utility of the CP is zero. Thus,
if bargaining occurs, the CP would get a positive payoff, and
the percentage of the increase in the utility of the CP would
be 100. In Figure 7, we can see a threshold on v2 after which
the bargaining does not occur. This threshold is decreasing
with respect to ζ. The reason is intuitive: even in a bargaining
framework, due to limited resources, sponsoring does not occur
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Fig. 8: The percentage of increase in the utility of the SP when
κu =
1
ζ with respect to v2 for different values of ζ.
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Fig. 9: The percentage of increase in the utility of the CP when
κu =
1
2ζ with respect to v2 for different values of ζ.
if the CP needs a high quality to be sponsored, and/or the
quality of non-sponsored data is important for the SP.
Results in Figure 8 reveal that the percentage of increase
in the utility of the SP after bargaining is decreasing with
respect to v2. In other words, the higher the importance of non-
sponsored data for the end-users and subsequently the SP, the
lower the incentive of the SP for participating in a bargaining
game. Note that the case ζ = 2 is corresponding to a minimum
quality stable outcome in the short-sighted framework. Thus,
bargaining does not add greatly to the utility of the SP. On the
other hand, ζ = 4 and ζ = 8 are corresponding to a stable point
of no sponsoring in the short sighted framework. Therefore,
the increase in the utility of the SP from bargaining is higher
in these two cases than ζ = 2. In addition, the percentage of
increase is decreasing with respect to ζ. In other words, the
higher the minimum quality needed to be sponsored, the lower
the incentive of the SP for a bargaining framework.
In Figures 9 and 10, the percentage of the increase in the
payoff of the CP and the SP is plotted when κu = 12ζ . Note
that for the case of ζ = 0.2, when v2 is small, the stable
outcome of a short-sighted market would be the maximum
bit sponsoring. Since, in this case, this stable outcome, yields
the highest payoff for the SP and the CP, bargaining cannot
create additional profit. Thus, the percentage of increase in
the utility of the SP and the CP is zero up a threshold. For
v2 higher than this threshold, and the cases ζ = 4 and ζ = 8,
the corresponding short-sighted outcome of the market is no
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Fig. 10: The percentage of increase in the utility of the SP
when κu = 12ζ with respect to v2 for different values of ζ..
sponsoring stable outcome. Thus, the results is similar to the
previous figures (Figures 7 and 8).
Note that bargaining can enforce sponsoring for the set
of parameters that have no stable sponsoring outcome in a
sequential game. However, the bargaining framework cannot
always enforce sponsoring. In particular, if the CP needs to
sponsor a high quality (high ζ) for the content, or the quality
of non-sponsored content is important for the end-users and
subsequently the SP (high v2), then sponsoring does not occur
regardless of the framework used.
The next set of numerical results investigate the relation
between the number of available resources (Nˆ ) and the Nash
bargaining price (p∗). Intuitively, one may expect that higher
number of available resources yields a lower valuation of the
SP for each unit of resources, and subsequently a lower price
for each bit. While this line of thought seems to be true in
the sequential framework, numerical results reveal a more
complex relationship between p∗ and Nˆ in the bargaining
framework: the negotiated price can be increasing, decreasing,
or a combination of both (Figures 11 and 12).
The reason for this counter-intuitive behavior is the different
disagreement payoffs resulting from different asymptotic out-
comes of the game when decision makers are short-sighted.
The disagreement payoffs can be considered as a form of
bargaining power for each decision maker, and can affect the
excess profit resulted by bargaining. Thus, different disagree-
ment payoffs lead to different amounts of excess profit and its
division between the CP and the SP, and subsequently different
behavior of price per sponsored bit.
V. DISCUSSIONS
First in Section V-A, we present high-level perspective of the
results. Then in Section V-B, we discuss about the modeling
and assumptions of this paper, their implications, and their
generalizations.
A. Summary of Key Results
We discussed that relation between the minimum quality
the CP requests, i.e. ζ, and the stable quality, i.e. 1κu ,
24 is
24Recall that the stable quality is defined in Definition 4.
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the available number of bits when κu = 1ζ .
an important factor in determining the asymptotic outcome
of the market (Section III-E). In particular if the CP over-
provisions the minimum quality, i.e. ζ > 1κu , then there is no
stable sponsoring outcome. The stability can be achieved when
ζ < 1κu (under-provision). However, the set of parameters for
which the market is stable is larger when ζ = 1κu . Thus, a
QSD framework is more likely to emerge for CPs that know
the dynamic of their demand ( 1κu ) and are willing to disclose
it (by requesting ζ = 1κu ). However, note that in a sequential
framework and if ζ = 1κu , the utility of the CP would be zero,
i.e. the additional profit of the CP by sponsoring the content
would be fully extracted if the CP reveals the true value of
the stable quality. Thus, the CP would be indifferent between
this scheme and neutrality, while the SP receives a higher
payoff in QSD scheme. While in a bargaining framework (if
it happens), both the CP and the SP receive a higher payoff
in comparison to a neutral framework. Thus, a bargaining
framework is preferable especially for the CP.
We showed that a CP with a volatile demand, i.e. a CP
whose users are sensitive to the quality (high γ), leads to
a no-sponsoring outcome in a sequential framework (non-
cooperative scenario) if both the SP and CP are short-sighted.
Examples of such CPs are streaming websites and emerging
CPs (start ups). Thus, a QSD framework is not a viable
scenario in long run for these CPs, if the decision-makers
are short-sighted. For these CPs, we can expect a stable QSD
framework only if one of the CP or the SP is long-sighted,
or in a bargaining game framework. In addition, we showed
that even in a bargaining framework, an SP who assigns high
weights to the satisfaction of users that use the non-sponsored
data (high v2v1 ), chooses to not sponsor the content of a CP
who needs high quality (high ζ). 25
Moreover, results reveal that investment by the SP is not
always in favor of having a stable QSD. Increasing the number
of available resources for sponsoring (investment by the SP),
when at least one of the decision makers is long-sighted,
increases the range of the parameters by which a stable QSD
framework occurs. However, when both the SP and CP are
short-sighted, increasing the number of resources may lead to a
scenario in which the CP sponsors a large number of resources.
If the demand is volatile, this yields a sudden jump in the
demand, and drives the market to a no-sponsoring outcome
(the jump in demand decreases the quality below the minimum
quality), and leads the CP to use the best-effort scenario.
B. Comments on the Assumptions of the Model
We assume logarithmic functions for the demand update
function and utilities owing to its concavity. However, our
analysis and insights are expected to be applicable to other
concave functions with diminishing returns.
Note that the focus of this work is on the interaction between
an SP and a CP, and not on the competition among SPs and
CPs. In particular, we consider that only one CP wants to
sponsor a quality for her users, and the rests stick to the best
effort scenario. The effects of other CPs are considered by the
SP as part of her utility. Introducing competition among CPs
and SPs would introduce another level of strategic decisions
by them. It does not necessarily alter the high-level intuitions
for the interaction of the CP and the SP provided in this work.
For example, we can expect that even under competition, a
CP with a volatile demand would not be a good options for
a QSD framework in a non-cooperative scenario. However,
considering the competition among CPs provides intuitions on
the possible structure of the Internet market in future under a
QSD framework. For example, a possible outcome would be
the case that competitive CPs divide SPs (and subsequently
end-users) among themselves and each sponsors the quality
of the content on only one of the SPs. Using this, each CP
can secure a monopoly over users. This would be a mild
version of the “Internet fragmentation” which might be an
undesirable outcome for users and from the perspective of the
FCC. A possible direction for future work is to consider the
competition over end-users among ISPs and CPs.
In addition, we assume that quality is sponsored by reserving
a number of resources, e.g. LTE time-frames. In general, SPs
can sponsor high quality for users of CPs using various meth-
ods, e.g. by prioritization of the content of a CP. Analyzing
different methods of sponsoring the quality of a content is
beyond the scope of this paper.
25As explained in the model, the parameter v2 can also represent the
regulatory policies for the quality of the experience of the users that use
the non-sponsored content. In this case, a high v2 is corresponding to stricter
(net-neutrality) rules.
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VI. CONCLUSION
We introduced the problem of quality-sponsored data (QSD)
in cellular networks and studied its implications on market en-
tities in sequential and bargaining game frameworks in various
scenarios. The direct coupling between the scarce (wireless)
resources and the market decisions resulting from QSD has
been taken into account, Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
and Nash Bargaining Solution of the problem is characterized,
and the market dynamics and equilibira have been investigated.
We provided strategies for (i) SPs: to determine if and how to
price resources, and (ii) CPs: to determine if and how many
resources to sponsor (what quality). In this work, we focused
on the interaction between ISPs and CPs. A possible direction
for future work is to consider the competition over end-users
among ISPs and CPs. Another direction is to consider the
effects of QSD on the payments of user to SPs, and its
implications on the results.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
First we consider the case in which dt > Nˆζ . In this case,
ζdt > Nˆ . Therefore, there is no feasible solution for bt.
Thus, as we mentioned previously after (7), in this case of
infeasibility, the CP exits the sponsorship program, i.e. z∗t = 0.
In addition, from (3), dt = 0 yields uCP,t(bt) < 0 for every
bt > 0, and subsequently z∗t = 0. This completes the proof of
(9).
Thus, henceforth, we consider 0 < dt ≤ Nˆζ . Clearly, the
utility of the CP (3) is concave. Thus, the first order optimality
condition provides us with the candidate optimum answer for
(7). The first order condition yields that bˆt = αdtpt . In order to
be an optimum answer, bˆt should be feasible, i.e. ζdt ≤ bˆt ≤
Nˆ . This characterizes a region for pt, αdtNˆ ≤ pt ≤ αζ . In order
to determine z∗, we should check non-negativity of u∗CP,t. The
utility of the CP with bˆt = αdtpt is non-negative if pt ≤ ακCPe .
Since ζκCP > e 26, αζ <
ακCP
e . Therefore, a feasible solution
for (8) yields a non-negative payoff. Thus, z∗t = 1. This is the
second region from top in (8).
If pt ≤ αdtNˆ , then the top boundary condition b∗t = Nˆ is
the optimum answer of (8). In addition, since in this region
uCP,t(Nˆ) is positive, z∗t = 1. This is the first optimality
region of (8). On the other hand, if pt ≥ αζ , then the lower
boundary condition, i.e. b¯t = ζdt, is the optimum answer of the
optimization. The condition for uCP,t(b¯t) ≥ 0 and therefore
z∗t = 1 is pt ≤ α log(κCP ζ)ζ which yields the third optimality
region in (8). If pt >
α log(κCP ζ)
ζ , uCP,t(bt) < 0. Thus, z
∗
t = 0.
This concludes the proof.
26The condition to have a non-trivial problem stated in Section II.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Theorem 1 implies that if dt > Nˆζ , or dt = 0, or
pt >
α log(κCP ζ)
ζ , the CP does not participate in the sponsoring
program. Thus, the value of y∗t does not affect the outcome
of the market in these cases. Without loss of generality, we
assume that in these cases the SP does not offer the program,
i.e. y∗t = 0.
Thus, henceforth, we consider 0 < dt ≤ Nˆζ and pt ≤
α log(κCP ζ)
ζ . Note that in this region, by Theorem 1, bt > 0.
Thus, the SP maximization problem is,
max
pt
uSP,t(pt) = max
pt
(
ptb
∗
t + ν1dt log
(
κSP b
∗
t
dt
)
+
+ ν2D log
(
κSP
N − b∗t
D
))
,
(20)
where b∗t is the equilibrium outcome of the second stage. Let
pt ≤ αdtNˆ . Then from Theorem 1, b∗t = Nˆ . Thus, uSP,t(pt) is
a strictly increasing function of pt. Therefore, all prices less
than αdt
Nˆ
yields a strictly lower payoff than p∗1,t =
αdt
Nˆ
, which
is the first candidate pricing strategy. Next, let αζ ≤ pt ≤
α log(κCP ζ)
ζ . Thus, from Theorem 1, b
∗
t = ζdt. Again, in this
region, uSP,t(pt) is a strictly increasing function of pt. Thus,
p∗2,t =
α log(κCP ζ)
ζ strictly dominates all other prices in this
interval, which yields the second candidate pricing strategy27.
For the case that αdt
Nˆ
≤ pt ≤ αζ , from Theorem 1, b∗t = αdtpt .
In this region, the first order condition on uSP,t(pt) provides
us with the local extremum,
p∗3,t = α
ν1dt + ν2D
ν1N
(21)
Since the second order derivative can be negative or positive,
the first order condition provides us with only a candidate
optimum answer, which is the third candidate pricing strategy.
This candidate strategy should satisfy the condition αdt
Nˆ
≤
p∗3,t ≤ αζ . If not, it would not be an optimum answer since,
as we discussed earlier in the proof, every price less than
(respectively, higher than) αdt
Nˆ
(respectively, αζ ) is dominated
by αdt
Nˆ
(respectively, α log(κCP ζ)ζ )
28. Note that these candidate
strategies are optimum only if they yield a payoff higher
than the payoff of the SP in the case of no-sponsoring, i.e.
v2D log(κSP
N
D ). The result follows.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We characterize the possible stable outcomes of the game
when at each time t, the SP and the CP choose their strategy
27Note that p∗2,t =
α log(κCP ζ)
ζ
yields a payoff of zero for the CP.
However, since we have assumed that the indifferent CP chooses to join the
sponsorship program, z∗t = 1 and subsequently y∗t = 1.
28Note that from Theorem 1, prices higher than α log(κCP ζ)
ζ
leads to no
sponsoring on the CP side.
to be the SPNE of the game characterized in Theorems 1 and
2.
The first candidate stable outcome is trivial: as soon as one
of the CP or SP exits the sponsorship program, or dt > Nˆζ , or
dt = 0, the program will not be resumed.
Now consider the case that sponsoring occurs. In this
case, y = 1 z = 1, and from Theorem 2, the SP chooses
one of the candidate optimum pricing strategies from the
set P ∗ = {αdt
Nˆ
, α log(κCP ζ)ζ , α
ν1dt+ν2D
ν1N
}. We show that the
first, the second, and the third candidate pricing strategies are
corresponding to the second, the third, and the fourth stable
outcome, respectively. Note that when choosing these prices,
by Theorem 2, the demand should be feasible, i.e. 0 < dt ≤ Nˆζ .
In addition, recall that by Lemma 1, the demand is stable when
d = κub.
Now, we obtain the second stable outcome by considering
that p = αd
Nˆ
and 0 < dt ≤ Nˆζ . In this case, from Theorem 1,
b = Nˆ . Thus p = ακu since d = κuNˆ . The feasibility
condition yields that d = κuNˆ ≤ Nˆζ ⇒ κu ≤ 1ζ 29.
Next, we obtain the third stable outcome by considering p =
α log(κCP ζ)
ζ and 0 < dt ≤ Nˆζ . In this case, from Theorem 1,
b = ζd, and subsequently from the stability condition, d =
κub = κuζd. Therefore, this case occurs if κuζ = 1. Note that
the demand could be any positive value less than or equal to Nˆζ
(feasibility condition), and with this demand, 0 < b = ζd ≤ Nˆ .
Finally, the fourth possible stable outcome happens when
p = α ν1d+ν2Dν1N , p ∈ [αdNˆ , αζ ] (from Theorem 2), and 0 < dt ≤
Nˆ
ζ . In this case, from Theorem 1, b =
αd
p . In order to have
a stable outcome, d = κub ⇒ p = ακu. Thus, from p =
α ν1dt+ν2Dν1N , d = Nκu − ν2ν1D and b = N − ν2ν1κuD. Note that
b should satisfy 0 < b ≤ Nˆ , and from Theorem 2, we know
that p = α ν1d+ν2Dν1N is optimum if it is in the interval [
αd
Nˆ
, αζ ].
The latter yields that αd
Nˆ
≤ p = ακu ≤ αζ , which yields
that κu ≤ 1ζ and b = αdp ≤ Nˆ . Note that these conditions
automatically lead to a feasible demand: from b = αdp ≤ Nˆ ,
then d ≤ Nˆpα = Nˆκu ≤ Nˆζ . Thus, in this stable outcome,
κu ≤ 1ζ and 0 < b ≤ Nˆ . The result follows.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
By (24), the utility of the SP when choosing the tuple(
d, 1, α log(κCP ζ)ζ , 1, ζd
)
is:
uSP = αd log (κSP ζ)+ ν1d log (κSP ζ)+ ν2D log
(
κSP
N − ζd
D
)
First, note that the expression of the utility is concave in d.
Thus, the first order condition gives the optimum answer. The
solution of the first order condition is:
d∗ =
N
ζ
− 1
(α+ ν1) log (κSP ζ)
29Note that d = κuNˆ > 0.
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Based on Theorem 3, for d∗ to be the demand corresponding
to the minimum quality stable outcome, it should satisfy the
constraint 0 < d∗ ≤ Nˆζ . If d∗ > Nˆζ or d∗ < 0, the concavity
implies that the optimum is d = Nˆζ or d = 0, respectively.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
First, note that in Theorem 3, when κu = 1ζ , the stable points
2, 3, and 4 can occur. In addition, the demand is fixed in the
stable point 2 and 4, while it can take a range of values for the
stable point 3, including the fixed demands in the other two
stable points. On the other hand, the price is fixed in all these
three stable points. In these stable points, the stable quality is
b
d = ζ. Thus, by (24), the payoff of the SP is:
uSP = pζd+ ν1d log (κSP ζ) + ν2D log
(
κSP
N − ζd
D
)
Therefore, for a fixed demand, the payoff of the SP in this case
is an increasing function of the price p. Note that the third
stable point, i.e. minimum quality stable point, has the highest
price among the possible stable points since log(κCP ζ) > 1.30
In addition, it can take a range of demand including the fixed
demands of the stable point 2 and 4 . Thus, the third stable
outcome of the market yields the highest payoff for the SP.
The optimum demand is chosen by Theorem 4 as discussed
before. The result follows.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
First note that from Corollary 1, the minimum quality stable
point, i.e.
(
d, 1, α log(κCP ζ)ζ , 1, ζd
)
, yields a payoff of zero for
the CP. From Lemma 1, in both the maximum bit sponsor-
ship, i.e.
(
κuNˆ , 1, ακu, 1, Nˆ
)
, and interior stable point, i.e.(
Nκu − ν2ν1D, 1, ακu, 1, N − ν2κuν1D
)
, the stable quality ( bd )
is 1κu . Thus, using (3), the payoff of the CP in these plausible
stable outcomes is:
uCP = αd
(
log
(
κCP
κu
)
− 1
)
Note that from the condition for plausibility of these stable
points (κu ≤ 1ζ ), and our previous assumption that κCP ζ >
e31, κCPκu > e. Thus, the payoff of the CP in the maximum
bit sponsorship and the interior stable point is strictly greater
than zero, and is strictly increasing with respect to the demand.
Given that the quality bd =
1
κu
, and is a constant, the higher the
number of sponsored bits, the higher the demand, and therefore
the higher the payoff of the CP would be. In addition, note that
the number of sponsored bits in the maximum bit sponsorship
point is greater than or equal to the number of sponsored bits
in the interior stable point. Thus, the utility of the CP in the
maximum bit sponsoring point is greater than or equal to the
utility in the interior stable point. The result follows.
30In Section II, we assumed that in order to have a non-trivial problem
κCP ζ > e
31The condition to have a non-trivial problem.
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PROOF OF THEOREM 7
dCP and dSP are independent of d and p. In addition,
uexcess = (uCP − dCP ) + (uSP − dSP ) is independent of
p, and is only a function of d. Thus, for a given d, using
equation (2) of [24], the optimum value of p is such that:
uCP − dCP
w
=
uSP − dSP
1− w
if the solution for p satisfies other constraints. Thus, by
plugging the expressions for the CP and the SP ((14) and (15)),
the candidate optimum p as a function of d is:
p∗ =
κu
d
(
(1− w)(uad − dCP )− w(us − dSP )
)
=
κu
d
(
(uad − dCP )− wuexcess
) (22)
Substituting (22) in the objective function of (16) and using
(14) and (15) yield the new objective function:
ww(1− w)w(uad − dCP + us − dSP ) = ww(1− w)wuexcess
Substituting (22), (14), and (15) in the constraint uCP ≥ dCP ,
yields the new constraint uad − dCP + us − dSP ≥ 0. Similar
substitutions for uSP ≥ dSP yields the same constraint. Thus,
the optimization can be written as,
max
d
uexcess
s.t.
0 ≤ d ≤ Nˆκu
uad − dCP + us − dSP = uexcess ≥ 0
(23)
The theorem follows from above and (22).
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APPENDIX H
COMMENTS ON THE APPROXIMATIONS IN THE MODEL
Note that in our model, we have assumed that either the CP
sponsor a quality for her end-users or she uses the best effort
scenario (both cannot happen together). This means that in the
second case (no sponsoring) the demand of the CP would be
added to the pool of the demand for the best effort scenario,
i.e. would be added to D. In our model, we do not considered
the augmentation since we naturally expect the demand for a
CP to be much smaller than the total demand for all CPs. In
this section, we discuss if and how the results change if we
consider this augmentation.
A. Change in the Model
The augmentation in the demand can be accommodated as
follows:
1) The SP:
uSP,t(pt) = ptbt + us(bt(pt)) (24)
where now the users’ satisfaction function, i.e. us(.), becomes:
us(bt) =

ν1dt log
(
κSP bt
dt
)
+ ν2D log
(
κSP
N − bt
D
)
(25a)
if dt > 0& bt > 0
ν2(D + dt) log
(
κSP
N − bt
(D + dt)
)
Otherwise (25b)
Note that (25a) is the same as (5a). Thus, the only change
is for the case of no sponsoring (dt = 0 or bt = 0) (25b)
in which dt is added to the total demand of the best effort
scenario, i.e. D. Note that (25b) becomes similar to (5b) when
dt << D.
2) The CP: Note that we have considered that the CP
receives a payoff of zero in the case of no sponsoring. This
is justified as in many cases in which if the CP does not
sponsor the data, then she will only transmit the content with
a best effort scenario and because of limited bandwidth do
not transmit advertisements. An example of this can be seen
in Youtube: If the quality of the content is low, then Youtube
automatically skips the ad. Thus, in this case, when the CP
transmits with best effort, it receives zero ad revenue.
B. Change in the Analytical Results
This change may only affect the results when (i) the exact
expression of us(bt) in the case of no sponsoring, i.e. (25b),
or (ii) the expressions for the optimum strategies of the SP,
i.e. p∗t is used. Note that in Theorem 1 we do not use any of
(i) and (ii). Thus, the Theorem would be similar to before. In
the next paragraph, we will argue that the expressions for p∗t
in Theorem 2 would be the same as before. In Theorem 3, we
only use the expression for p∗t . Thus, the results of Theorem
3 would be the same as before. In Theorems 4 and 5, we
use (25a) (which is similar to (5a)) and the expression of p∗t
(which are the same as before). Thus, the the results for these
theorems also would be as before. For the long-sighted case,
we do not use the exact expression of us(b). Thus, all the
results of long-sighted would be as before.
Now, we argue that the expressions for the optimum strate-
gies of the SP in Theorem 2 would be the same as before. The
first paragraph of the proof would be the same as before since
we do not use (25b). In addition, in the next paragraph of the
proof and when characterizing the optimum strategies of the
SP, we focus on 0 < dt ≤ Nˆζ and pt ≤ α log(κCP ζ)ζ . With these
conditions, bt > 0 and sponsoring occurs. Thus, we use the
expression of uSP (pt) for the case of sponsoring (25a) which
is the same as before, i.e. (5a). Thus, the expressions for the
optimum strategies of the SP would be the same as before.
Note that the only change that should be applied to Theo-
rem 2 is to the expression of uSP,0, i.e. the utility of the SP
in the case of no sponsoring. This utility should be changed
from (5b) to (25b), i.e. uSP,0 = v2(D + dt) log(κSP ND+dt ).
C. Change in the Simulation Results
Since the SP now receives a greater utility in the case of
no sponsoring (compare (5b) with (25b)), the option of no-
sponsoring becomes more attractive for the SP. We have redone
all the simulations with the new model. We comment on all
the changes in the numerical results, and present the results
for one sample scenario (Figure 13).
Changes to Figures 3 to 6: In the numerical results, we
observe that these figures will remain similar in general. The
only change is that the region of no sponsoring for large
v2 slightly increases (since the no-sponsoring is now more
attractive for the SP). Thus, the insights associated with these
figures would be the same as before.
Changes to Figures 7 and 9: Now, consider the numerical
results for the long-sighted scenario. In this case, for Figures
7 and 9, we observe the thresholds for the jump to no-
sponsoring region slightly decreases (as we expect because
of the explanations in the first paragraph of Appendix H-B).
Otherwise, the figures would be the same as before. This is
because of the fact that the utility of the CP is the same as
before.
Changes to Figures 8 and 10: We plot the counterpart of
Figure 8, in Figure 13. Note that the results are similar. The
only difference is that the percentage of increase in the utility
of the SP decreases in some regions (regions in which short-
sighted yields no sponsoring). This is because of the increase
in the utility of the SP in the case of no sponsoring. The same
happens to Figure 9. Thus, the insights associated with these
figures remain the same.
Changes to Figures 11 and 12: Recall that p∗ is the price
of sponsored bits in the bargaining framework, and is distinct
from p∗t which is the price of sponsored bits in the short-
sighted framework. Results reveal that the insights associated
with these figures follow the same trend as before. Note that
p∗ depends on the disagreement payoff which is the payoff of
short-sighted framework. Thus, the only change to the value
of p∗ happens when the disagreement yields no sponsoring. In
this case, since the payoff of disagreement increases slightly
(25b), p∗ increases slightly.
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Fig. 13: The percentage of increase in the utility of the SP
when κu = 1ζ with respect to v2 for different values of ζ (new
model).
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Fig. 14: The percentage of increase in the utility of the SP
when κu = 1ζ with respect to v2 for different values of ζ (old
model).
